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Abstract: Stormwater runoff generally increases
with the level of urbanization because the percentage of
land with impervious surfaces increases. Traditional
residential stormwater runoff control practices
predominately use regulatory tools such as zoning
ordinances and mandatory construction regulations to
control runoff. However, the introduction of voluntary
incentive based policies can encourage developers to
exceed the regulatory control standard when the
economic incentive is sufficiently large to encourage
voluntarily adoption of low impact Best Management
Practices (BMPs). A voluntary stormwater banking
program (SBP) is presented that increases both developer
profit and regional water quality relative to the existing
regulatory policy. Developers participating in the
program receive a site density bonus that allows them to
construct subdivisions at a higher residential density than
allowed under current regulations. The density bonus
specifies the maximum number of additional lots that can
be developed within a subdivision. Participating
developers agree to incorporate low impact BMPs into
their stormwater management design and pay a
participation fee to the SBP. The SBP specifies the
residential runoff level the developer must achieve to
receive the density bonus. The value of the density bonus
is influenced by the price of the additional lots sold and
the additional low impact BMP cost. When the net
economic value of the density bonus lots is greater than
the additional cost of adopting the required BMPs plus
paying the participation fee, the profit maximizing
developer will participate in the program. In addition to
potentially increasing developer profit, the proposed
program benefits regional water quality in two ways.
First, developers participating in the SBP provide
stormwater runoff control above the minimum regulatory
standard on new developments. Second, the collected
participation fee can subsequently be used to retrofit
outdated and/or poorly functioning BMPs in existing
developments to enhance/protect regional water quality.

Introduction
As urbanization density increases, less surface area
becomes permeable to water and stormwater runoff from
urban development increases. The increased stormwater
runoff transports greater amounts of pollutants and
nutrient loadings into water supplies. Stormwater control
is conventionally addressed using regulatory tools such
as imposing residential density limits and open space
requirements. Incentive based policies that can achieve
more stringent runoff control objectives and are
supported by residential developers provide an
opportunity to exceed the existing regulatory standard
while increasing developer profits and regional water
quality. Toward this end, a voluntary stormwater banking
program (SBP) is developed that allows residential
developers to build at greater densities in exchange for
achieving an grater level of stormwater runoff control by
incorporating low impact development (LID) stormwater
Best Management Practices (BMPs) into their residential
developments and paying a participation fee to the SBP.
The participation fee is calculated as a share of the profits
earned from lot sales resulting from building at the higher
density. The proposed density bonus allows the
developer to develop additional lots, or bonus lots, on the
same amount of land. If the developer chooses to exceed
the specified minimum control standard to participate in
the SBP by using additional LID BMPs, they receive a
percentage-based rebate of the participation fee.
Literature Review
Randall and Taylor (2000) provide an overview of
the merits of incentive based environmental policies.
They emphasize that incentive based policies provide
more flexibility than command and control policies, and
have lower compliance costs. Parikh et al. (2005) provide
a hydrologic, economic and legal framework for
examining incentive and market based instruments to
reduce stormwater runoff and illustrate how a voluntary
offset program provides an incentive for landowners to
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reduce runoff with low impact BMPs. Thurston et al.
(2003) examine runoff control using tradable allowances
based on impervious surface area. They show that the
possibility of earning revenue from selling excess
allowances provides property owners with an incentive to
build low impact BMPs with greater detention capacity
than the minimum regulatory requirement.
Several cost effectiveness studies of stormwater
BMPs have been conducted. Brown and Schueler (1997)
provide cost estimates for the Mid-Atlantic States.
Wossink and Hunt (2003) estimate BMP construction,
maintenance and land costs in North Carolina. Hathaway
and Hunt (2007) estimate BMP construction costs in
North Carolina. Montalto et al. (2007) examined the cost
effectiveness of LID for reducing sewer overflow and
found that only under high cost, poor design scenarios, is
LID not cost-effective relative to common sewer
overflow tanks. Landphair (2001) reviewed the cost to
performance ratios of several stormwater BMPs and
found that infiltration basins tend to be the most cost
effective BMPs in terms of cost per pound of total
suspended solids (TSS) removed in watersheds larger
than 10 acres. Weiss et al. (2007) analyzed cost
effectiveness in terms of suspended sediments and total
phosphorous control for six stormwater BMPs used to
treat urban runoff, and found that if land cost is ignored
constructed wetlands are most cost-effective. However,
in urban environments where land costs are high, less
land intensive BMPs may be more cost effective.

score). The site score is a complex function of factors
impacting runoff such as impervious cover, soil factors,
infiltration factors, sediment factors and particulate
runoff factors. Each individual factor is scored on a scale
from zero to ten and weighted based on its relative
importance in determining the amount and severity of
runoff. A site score of zero implies that all runoff
eventually leaves the subdivision and adversely impacts
regional water quality. A site score of 100 implies that
almost all runoff and particulates are trapped within the
subdivision and water quality impacts are minimal.
For Greenville, South Carolina, a site score of 40 is
consistent with the effectiveness of the current minimum
regulatory standard. Alternative combinations of low
impact BMPs were introduced into various subdivision
stormwater management designs to estimate the effect of
the BMPs on the site score using the IDEAL simulation
model (Barfield et al, 2005). An iterative simulation
procedure is used to determine both the appropriate
combination of low impact and traditional BMPs, and the
scale of the identified BMPs to meet a specific site score.
Once the combination of BMPs and the associated scale
level of implementation is determined to achieve a
specific site score, the data is combined with a BMP cost
data set to estimate the cost of increasing the site score
from the regulatory baseline score of 40 to the targeted
higher site score (Huber et al., 2010).
Given the uncertainty regarding the type of single
family residence likely to be built on any subdivision lot
and/or the final selling price of the house, together with
the reality that the developer needs to know the economic
benefit of participating in the SBP before any houses are
constructed, expected lot price instead of house price is
used to estimate likely developer profit from participating
in the SBP. Developer participation profit before
considering the additional low impact BMP costs and any
participation fee rebate is specified in equation 1:

Stormwater Banking Program
The fundamental idea behind the design of the SBP
is to align the incentives of stormwater control authorities
and developers so that stormwater runoff is reduced
beyond the current regulatory standard to jointly increase
developer profit and improve regional water quality. The
proposed economic incentive is to allow residential
builders to build at a higher density if they achieve a
target control goal beyond the regulatory minimum.
Greenville, South Carolina specifies area specific density
limits for new developments. In exchange for relaxing
the density limit and allowing more housing lots to be
constructed on the same acreage, bonus lots, the
developer must reduce stormwater runoff below the
current regulatory standard by incorporating low impact
BMPs into the development. The developer pays a
participation fee to the SBP, calculated as a percentage of
profit on bonus lot sales. The participation fee is
subsequently used to retrofit outdated and/or poorly
functioning BMPs in existing developments to
enhance/protect regional water quality.
The metric used to determine the level of stormwater
runoff reduction is the Site Runoff Index Score (site

(1)

[ LB  PB  %S B  ( PNB  PB )  LNB ] u (1  c) ,

where,
ʌ:

program profit before possible program rebate
and additional BMP costs,
LNB: number of original subdivision lots,
LB: number of bonus lots,
PNB: original lot price,
PB: new lot price at bonus density,
%ʌB: percent profit on bonus lot sales,
0  %ʌB  1,
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fraction of density profits paid to the SBP as
the participation fee, 0  c  1.

a:

The first term on the right-hand side of equation 1,
measures developer profit from selling bonus lots. The
second term reflects potential lost profit to the developer
on the original lots if lot price decreases at the higher
building density. When there is no price decrease, the
bonus lots sell for the same price as the original lots and
the second term in equation 1 equals zero. The lost profit
on the original non-bonus lots is not scaled by percent
profit because the cost of constructing the original nonbonus lots has not changed. Since the cost to construct
the original lots did not change with the changing density
the only thing that changes is revenue, that is the change
in lot price times the number of original lots. After any
lost profit on the original lots is subtracted from the profit
on the bonus lot sales, this density profit is multiplied by
the third term, one minus the fraction of density profit
paid to the SBP (1-c). The overall value is developer
profit before any possible rebate on the participation fee
and the additional LID BMP costs are considered.
Given space limitations, for simplicity, we assume
that the percent profit on the bonus lots is equal to the
percent profit on the original lots (%ʌB = %ʌNB).
However, profit on the bonus lots is likely to be higher
because the primary infrastructure costs (engineering and
site design, permits and impact fees, clearing and
grading, sewer and water infrastructure, and roads) to
construct the subdivision have already been incurred. The
largest cost incurred in constructing the additional
subdivision lots, is connecting the lots to sewer and water
services. Since the costs to construct the bonus lots are
much lower, it is likely the percent profit on these lots to
be higher than for the original lots.
If the developer chooses to exceed the target site
score, the minimum score needed to participate in the
SBP, through more intensive low impact BMP use, the
SBP provides a rebate on the original participation fee
that assumed the developer only achieved the minimum
target score. The rebate provides the developer with an
economic incentive to voluntarily incur additional LID
BMP costs to exceed the target site score when it is
profitable. The rebate is calculated using equation 2:
(2)

A

If the site score equals the target site score, then the
rebate is zero. Equation 3 is the sum of equations 1 and 2
and estimates developer profit before considering the
additional BMP costs (ʌ*):
(3)

S*

S  A.

When the additional LID BMP costs (CBMP) are
subtracted from ʌ* net program profit (Net ʌ*) is derived
as shown in equation 4:
(4)

NetS *

S *  C BMP .

If Net ʌ* is positive, the developer has an economic
incentive to participate in the SBP and will seek to
maximize net program profit subject to the conditions
imposed by the SBP. A comprehensive Excel based
spreadsheet program has been developed to provide the
developer with an estimate of the economic benefit of
program participation. The working name of the
developed program is the Decision Making Tool (DMT).
The tool is based on the logic discussed above, but also
provides the developer with additional benefits (site score
points) for incorporating regional and neighborhood
smart growth options into the location and design of a
subdivision. Because of space limitation the empirical
illustration is restricted to on-site adoption of LID BMPs.
Cost data from the Greenville, South Carolina area was
collected to estimate construction and maintenance costs
of the traditional stormwater management tools of dry
ponds and wet ponds, as well as the following
stormwater BMPs: bioretention cells, buffer strips,
bioswales, infiltration trenches, porous pavement, rain
barrels, green roofs, wetlands, and sand filters. A cost
equation is developed for each BMP. Revenue and cost
data is incorporated into a spreadsheet model to
determine whether the additional revenue from the lot
density bonus is sufficiently large to offset the cost of
adopting the enhanced BMPs plus paying the SBP
participation fee. Engineering formulas are used to
determine the mix of BMPs that most cost-effectively
achieve the runoff standard.

a  ( SC  TSC )  {( LB  PB  %S B  ( PNB  PB )  LNB )}  c

where,
A:
rebate on the participation fee,
TSC: target site score for SBP participation,
SC: site score achieved by the developer, SC 
TSC,
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percent rebate on participation fee for every
point SC exceeds TSC.

Empirical Illustration
Ansley Crossing, a 39 acre residential development
in Greenville, South Carolina, is used to illustrate the
developer benefit of initially entering the SBP at the
minimum target site score level, and then deciding to
exceed the target site score. Ansley Crossing has 11

buildable acres and under current density requirements,
38 lots can be built on the 11 acres. The remaining 28
acres consist of an unbuildable floodplain which serves
as a natural filtration area. The natural filtration area is
maintained in all illustrative comparisons. If the Ansley
Crossing developer achieves the minimum target site
score of 70, the developer can construct an additional 26
bonus lots within the subdivision. A participating
developer must pay 50% (c in equations 1and 2) of the
density related profit from the sale of the additional 26
bonus lots to the SBP as the participation fee.
Table 1 summarizes the economic cost and benefits
for optimal BMP combinations for four illustrative
scenarios. IDEAL in combination with the DMT was
used to determine the lowest cost BMP combination to
achieve a given site score in each Ansley Crossing
scenario. The top half of the table summarizes the cost
of the onsite BMP practices needed to achieve alternative
site scores for the four illustrative scenarios. The
baseline scenario uses traditional stormwater BMPs,
consisting of a combination of 28 acres of natural
filtration area and two dry ponds that total two-tenths of
an acre, to achieve the minimum regulatory required site
score of 40. Scenario 2 achieves the target site score of
70, the minimum score necessary to participate in the
SBP for the original 38 lot subdivision but assumes no
density bonus is available. The higher site score is
achieved by reducing the baseline dry pond area by half,
and replacing the lost dry pond area with 18 100 squarefoot bioretention cells on 18 lots, and a 50 square-foot
infiltration trench on the remaining 20 lots. This results
in a total of 1,800 square feet of bioretention cells and
1,000 square feet of infiltration trenches within the
development. Scenario 3 achieves the minimum target
site score of 70 to participate in the SBP for the same
subdivision, but at the bonus density development level
of 64 lots. With the addition of the 26 bonus lots, the
BMP plan developed for Scenario 2, must be modified to
achieve a site score of 70 at the higher building density.
The higher site score is achieved by using three-fourths
of the baseline dry pond area and adding a 90 square-foot
bioretention cell on 32 lots and a 50 square-foot
infiltration trench on the remaining 32 lots, for a total of
2,880 square-feet of bioretention cells and 1,600 squarefeet of infiltration trenches within the development.
Scenario 4 was developed to illustrate one set of changes
in BMP selection and/or intensity that would motivate a
developer to achieve a site score of 80, 10 points higher
than the minimum site score required for SBP
participation if the subdivision is built to the 64 lot
density bonus maximum. In this situation, three-quarters
of the original baseline dry pond area is retained and a
150 square-foot bioretention cell is incorporated into 32

Table 1. BMP Cost, Effective Participation Fee
and Profit by Scenario
Scenarios
BMP
Practice
Bioretention
Cell
Natural
Filtration
Infiltration
Trench
Buffer Strip

SC 2

SC 3

SC 4

$0

$10,015

$15,469

$25,053

$0

$0

$0

$0

$0

$4,629

$7,290

$10,837

$0

$0

$0

$0

Bioswale

$0

$0

$0

$0

Dry Pond

$10,060

$5,030

$7,545

$7,545

Wet Pond

$0

$0

$0

$0

Wetland

$0

$0

$0

$0

$0

$0

$0

$0

$0

$0

$0

$0

Green Roof

$0

$0

$0

$0

Rain Barrel

$0

$0

$0

$0

Total Cost

$10,060

$19,674

$30,303

$43,436

Site Score

40

70

70

80

Additional
BMP Cost

NA

$9,614

$20,243

$33,376

38

38

64

64

$46,500

$46,500

$46,500

$46,500

NA

$151,125

$151,125

Porous
Pavement
Sand Filter

Number of
Lots
Lot Price
Participation
Fee

---

Rebate

---

NA

NA

Effective
Fee

---

NA

$151,125

$120,900

---

NA

$151,125

$151,125

---

-$9,614

$130,882

$147,974

Program
Profit before
Rebate and
Additional
BMP Cost
Net Profit

$30,225

Note: All cost, benefit and profit measures are calculated
relative to the baseline scenario. Scenario 2 has a zero
program profit before subtracting additional BMP cost to the
achieve the target site score of 70 because there is no SBP in
place to reward developers that implement management plans
beyond the minimum regulatory requirements to achieve a
site score of 40. In scenarios 3 and 4, Net Profit is calculated
as the profit from the sale of additional lots, minus the
participation fee and Additional BMP Costs incurred, plus
any rebate the developer qualifies for. The Effective
Participation Fee is the Participation Fee less any Rebate.

housing lots, and a 75 square-foot infiltration trench is
included in the stormwater management plan for the
remaining 32 lots. In total, 4,800 square feet of
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Baseline

bioretention cells and 2,400 square feet of infiltration
trenches are used in Scenario 4 to achieve the site score
of 80. Other BMP combinations which achieve a given
site score were found, but are not reported due to space
limitations. As the number of residential lots increases,
impervious surface increases and the scale of BMPs
necessary to achieve a given site score will increase.
The bottom half of Table 1 summarizes developer
profit in each scenario. No net profit is reported for the
baseline scenario because under the baseline the
developer is not in the SBP. A total BMP cost of
$10,060 is incurred to achieve the regulatory minimum
site score of 40. Scenario 2 illustrates why the density
bonus is necessary to encourage developers to voluntarily
adopt LID BMPs. When the optimal combination of LID
BMPs are used to attain the target site score of 70, total
BMP cost is $19,674, $9,614 higher than in the baseline.
Scenario 3 illustrates the economic benefit of
participating in the SBP. Based on a review of 700 lots
sold in Greenville South Carolina between 2007 and
2009, an average lot price of $46,500 is used in this
illustration. Average profit per lot sold is assumed to be
25% based on discussions with eight Greenville real
estate developers. Despite the higher BMP cost incurred
to achieve the target site score of 70, the 26 lot density
bonus increases net developer profit by $130,882 even
though BMP cost is $20,243 higher than in the baseline
and $10,629 higher than they are in scenario 2. The
increased BMP cost in scenario 3 relative to scenario 2
results from the fact that additional BMPs must be
installed at the higher building density to control runoff.
In scenario 4 a site score of 80 is achieved. To achieve
this higher site score additional LID BMPs must be used.
To encourage a developer to design a stormwater
management plan that achieves the higher site score a
percentage rebate on the participation fee is used as the
carrot. In this illustration, for every point the
development site score exceeds the minimum target site
score of 70, the developer receives a 2% rebate on the
participation fee. After receiving the rebate and paying
the additional BMP cost, developer net program profit is
$147,974. Thus, with the rebate incentive, a profit
maximizing developer would both voluntarily enter the
SBP and design to the higher site score of 80 because the
rebate exceeds the additional LID BMP cost incurred in
increasing the site score from the minimum site score of
70 required to participate in the SBP.

SBP allows developers to build at a higher density in
exchange for adopting low impact stormwater best
management practices. An example development in
Greenville, South Carolina was used to demonstrate how
a policy of this type could both increase developer profit
and reduce stormwater runoff beyond current regulatory
standards. Moreover, the collected participation fee can
be used to retrofit substandard stormawater control
measures elsewhere in the community to improve
regional water quality.
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